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BOOK REVIEWS

Duty: A Review and Commentary
Gates, Robert M. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. Newburyport, Mass.: Knopf, 2014. 640pp. $25

The title of Duty could easily be
So You Want to Be the Secretary of
War, Violence, and Suffering? Gates’s
memoir takes the glamour out of the
position and makes sure the reader
grasps just how personally draining and ethically frustrating the job
can be. It is a book worth reading, if
only to learn more about the scope
of the issues that typically face any
conscientious Secretary of Defense.
To bring that point home, here are the
more important challenges and issues
that Gates had to deal with across two
presidential administrations: scaling back the U.S. military presence in
Iraq; scaling up that same presence in
Afghanistan; defending two controversial war policies before an often hostile
Congress; taking care of military personnel injured in Iraq and Afghanistan;
explaining to families of those killed in
both wars why their deaths mattered;
building personal relationships with
counterparts in other governments;
dampening the negative effects of “turf
wars” between White House staff and
officials (both uniformed and civilian)
in the Defense Department; sponsoring
the development of antimine vehicles
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that the career acquisition people in
the Army did not want; tailoring the
organization of U.S. and allied forces
in Afghanistan; fostering an organizational climate that would allow the
military services to move beyond “don’t
ask, don’t tell”; and serving as a trusted
adviser to two very different presidents from opposing political parties.
I find the list daunting. Robert Gates
too found it daunting, but he took on
those challenges and issues with energy,
patience, persistence, and loyalty to
the Republic. Duty is just the right title
for his memoir. It is what Gates swore
to do, and his memoir is an effort to
describe his role and the role of other
actors in some very crucial events.
The comments I have already read
about the book focus on Gates’s critical opinions of important personalities,
including Presidents George W. Bush
and Barack Obama, former Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, and several
senior military officers. If those criticisms are all one comes away with after
reading this book, the more important
stories told by Gates have been unfortunately missed. If you read the entire
book, you can step back and say, “Two
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presidents gambled by committing the
United States to two different wars,
and both presidents needed someone
to come along and ‘fix things’ when
those two bets didn’t play out as the
presidents expected and hoped.” Gates
was “the fixer”—dedicated, a hard
worker, disciplined, organized, experienced, well connected, and intelligent.
Gates was not in on the planning for the
war against Iraq. As he says on page 568,
“Had I been secretary of defense during
the winter of 2002–2003, I don’t know
whether I would have recommended
that President Bush invade Iraq.”
However, Gates does not second-guess
President Bush: “It would be disingenuous to say with ten years’ hindsight that
I would have been opposed, especially
since I publicly supported the decision
at the time.” Moreover, after citing all the
negative aspects of the war against Iraq,
Gates says, “I cannot honestly claim I
would have foreseen any or all of that.”
In any case, when he took over from
Donald Rumsfeld, he set aside his own
personal concerns and embarked on a
campaign to support President Bush.
Gates agreed with former Secretary
of Defense William Perry that “the
consequences of failure in Iraq would be
catastrophic—much more consequential than failure in Vietnam.” As Gates
argues, “A defeat of the U.S. military and
an Iraqi descent into a vicious civil war
that likely would engage other countries in the region would be disastrous,
destabilizing the region and dramatically
boosting Iran’s power and prestige.”
As President Bush’s Secretary of
Defense, Gates had three goals with
regard to Iraq: defend Bush’s decision
in late 2006 (even before Gates became
Defense Secretary) to “surge” U.S. forces
into Iraq, thereby allowing the troops
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time to achieve the president’s goals;
maximize “the possibility of keeping a substantial number of troops in
Iraq for years to come”; and establish
“a long-term security and strategic
relationship with Iraq.” It was imperative to “avoid even the appearance of
American failure or defeat in Iraq.”
In pursuit of these goals, Gates had to
support U.S. commanders in Iraq, especially General David Petraeus, and to
“buy time” in Washington for the surge
to take effect. Gates puts it this way:
“There was a Washington ‘clock’ and
a Baghdad ‘clock,’ and the two moved
at very different speeds. Our forces
needed time . . . , but much of Congress, most of the media, and a growing
majority of Americans had lost patience
with the war in Iraq. . . . My role was
to figure out how to buy time, how to
slow down the Washington clock, and
how to speed up the Baghdad clock.”
To buy time, Gates chose “to hold out
hope of beginning to end it.” Once the
surge forces were in place, by September 2007, Gates skillfully changed
the debate over the war, “making the
subject of the debate the pace of troop
withdrawals so as to extend the surge
as long as possible but also to try to
defuse the Iraq debate as a major issue in
the presidential election.” Gates is very
clear on this: “I wanted to focus the Iraq
debate on the pacing of drawdowns, a
debate I thought the generals would win
every time because it would be about
battlefield conditions and the situation
on the ground.” If he could buy time,
the U.S. government would not “put at
risk all we had achieved at such great
cost in lives by leaving a fledgling Iraqi
government at the mercy of its neighbors and its internal divisions.” Ultimately, “the critical question was how to
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preserve and expand our gains in Iraq
while maximizing support at home for a
sustainable long-term presence there.”
Gates’s plan (for his “Washington
campaign”) was in line with the goals
of President Bush. As media reviews
of Duty have already made clear, Gates
thought President Bush had been both
correct and courageous in opting for a
troop surge. However, the media reviews
that I have seen do not note as well that
Gates also supported Bush’s intent to
keep some U.S. forces in Iraq to support a post-Saddam government, train
a new Iraqi army and national police,
and remind the leaders of Iran that the
United States would and could counter
any Iranian efforts to subvert Iraq.
The key term here is “sustainable
long-term presence.” Would Congress
accept it? Could the volunteer Army do
it without wearing out? Gates worked
patiently and in a determined way to get
everyone who mattered “on board” with
President Bush’s long-term strategy. Yet
he knew that implementing the president’s strategy would have a high cost,
especially for the troops in Iraq. Gates
admits that extending troop deployments in Iraq from twelve to fifteen
months was the most difficult decision
he would make in his entire time as
secretary, but he also believes it was the
right decision, and he was confident that
it would be a temporary extension. Like
General Petraeus and President Bush,
Gates believed that the “surge” would
work, but only if given enough time.
Gates has a lot to say about the conflict in Afghanistan and the decisions
made in Washington regarding the
conduct of the campaign there. A lot
of media attention has been given to
Gates’s descriptions of the disputes and
discussions among key individuals,
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including President Obama, Secretary
of State Clinton, and Vice President
Biden. This attention, however, misses a
major point. Along with Admiral Mike
Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Gates believed that “the war in
Afghanistan had been neglected and
underresourced [sic] in the Bush administration.” Yet Gates was very concerned
that troop levels in Afghanistan be kept
low enough so that Afghans would not
perceive U.S. and NATO soldiers as
occupiers (as against allies). Gates was
aware that “embassy polling showed that
in 2005 about 80 percent of Afghans
saw us as allies and partners; by summer
2009, after nearly eight years of war,
that number was down to 60 percent.”
President Obama had taken office
committed to prosecuting a military
campaign in Afghanistan against the
Taliban. Gates believed that when the
new president asked him to stay on as
Secretary of Defense Obama agreed with
him that the United States would suffer
strategically if it allowed the Taliban to
appear to have pushed the United States
out of Afghanistan. This was the link
between Iraq and Afghanistan—
the need to avoid having “extremist”
Muslims see the United States as having been defeated in either place. But
just how many soldiers would it take to
force the Taliban to agree to a settlement? That was the question that often
divided the new president’s White
House from Gates and the military.
President Obama had agreed to a small
U.S. troop increase in Afghanistan in
the spring of 2009, but how many more
soldiers were needed? Was there a parallel between Iraq and Afghanistan? Could
a surge of forces in Afghanistan force the
Taliban to negotiate with Hamid Karzai?
Would Karzai even talk to them? From
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September through November 2009,
Gates and other senior officials met to
answer these questions and thrash out
a clear strategy for the campaign in Afghanistan. There were three basic questions they had to answer. Just what was
the threat? What was the optimal way to
deal with that threat—counterinsurgency
or some form of counterterrorism? How
would the president and his advisers
know whether any strategy they adopted
was working? It was clear to Gates that
there was no unanimity among the
president’s closest advisers. Leon Panetta
has said that all that was achieved by the
major advisers after five lengthy meetings was an agreement that “we can’t
leave, and we can’t accept the status quo.”
The sticky issue was how to deal with
the problem. Early in his first term,
President Obama asked Bruce Riedel
(whom Gates describes as “a longtime
analyst at CIA . . . [and] one of the best,
most realistic Middle East analysts”) to
lead a sixty-day review of the situation in
Afghanistan. When the review team was
finished, its recommendations were as
follows: “Disrupt the terrorist networks
in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan;
promote a more effective government
in Afghanistan; develop the Afghan security forces; end Pakistan’s support for
terrorist and insurgent groups; enhance
civilian control in Pakistan; and use U.S.
diplomatic, military, and intelligence
channels to reduce enmity and distrust
between Pakistan and India.” Gates
called these recommendations “breathtaking,” requiring as they did “a fullyresourced counterinsurgency campaign.”
According to Gates, the new president “embraced most of the Riedel
recommendations and announced the
elements of his new ‘AfPak’ strategy in
a televised speech on March 27, 2009
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with his senior advisors standing behind
him.” Gates was struck by the fact that
the president “never used the words
counterinsurgency or counterterrorism
in the speech, but the strategy he announced was clearly a blend of both.”
Though he “fully supported the president’s decisions,” Secretary Gates had
serious doubts that the resources would
be available for the sort of campaign
that President Obama had described—a
campaign that used lots of civilian advisers, teachers, engineers, and lawyers.
In effect, President Obama said, his
approach was to strike “the Taliban in
their heartland” while at the same time
infusing the U.S. advisory effort with
a “surge” of civilians. Gates doubted
that this approach would work quickly,
if at all. The key factor was Pakistan.
As Gates knew, Pakistan’s “continuing
toleration of the Afghan Taliban . . . was
a hedging strategy based on [its] lack
of trust in the [United States], given
our unwillingness to stay engaged in
Afghanistan in the early 1990s.” Just
as troubling to Gates was the request
of the new commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
for significantly more soldiers. That
commander, General Stan McChrystal,
told Gates in late June 2009 “that he
had found the situation in Afghanistan much worse than he expected.”
Secretary Gates was placed in a very difficult position. On one hand, he had defended having a relatively small number
of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, to undercut claims by the Taliban
that “outsiders” were occupying the
country. Now the new ISAF commander
was asking for a major increase in the
number of military personnel. On the
other hand, the president had embraced
a strategy for Afghanistan that relied on
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large numbers of American and European civilians to help the Afghans develop
an effective and legitimate government,
useful local schools, and health-care
clinics. If the troops got to Afghanistan
and the civilians did not, what then?
Gates took his concern to the White
House chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel. “I
told Emanuel that the president needed
to ‘take ownership of the Afghan War,’
both for the troops and for our allies. . . .
He needed to acknowledge that the
war could take years but that he was
confident we would ultimately be successful. He needed to say publicly why
the troops’ sacrifices were necessary.”
Gates was acting then as the “fixer” that
he was—the Defense Secretary who
could make the best of a situation that
was not to the liking of either President Obama or the ISAF commander.
However, there was another “player” in
this drama, one that bedeviled Secretary
Gates—then known as the National
Security Staff, or NSS. This 350-person
organization had begun as staff support for the members of the National
Security Council and their deputies,
but it had grown into a bureaucracy
of its own, with what seemed to be a
will of its own. As Gates puts it, “The
National Security Staff had, in effect,
become an operational body with its
own policy agenda, as opposed to a
coordination mechanism. This, in turn,
led to micromanagement far beyond
what was appropriate.” Gates says that
for all its exhausting meetings, the
process by which strategy in Afghanistan
was hammered out in the fall of 2009
worked. That is, the different points of
view were considered, reviewed, and
then accepted or rejected by those serving as the president’s close advisers. Yet
the implementation of this strategy was
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hampered again and again by micromanagement from Washington’s NSS.
In the presidential election campaign
of 2008, Barack Obama had chosen to
take on leadership of the campaign in
Afghanistan against the Taliban. But
in 2009, according to Gates, he discovered that “U.S. goals in Afghanistan—a
properly sized, competent Afghan
national army and police, a working
democracy with at least a minimally
effective central government—were
embarrassingly ambitious (and historically naïve) when compared to the
meager human and financial resources
committed to the task, especially before
2009.” In short, the problem was far
more severe than Obama had thought.
Gates says that the president felt trapped.
“President Obama simply wanted the
‘bad’ war in Iraq to be ended, and once
in office, the U.S. role in Afghanistan—
the so-called good war—to be limited
in scope and duration. His fundamental
problem in Afghanistan was that his
political and philosophical preferences
. . . conflicted with his own pro-war
public rhetoric . . . , the nearly unanimous recommendations of his senior
civilian and military advisers at the
departments of State and Defense, and
the realities on the ground in Afghanistan.” However, what Gates calls “the
continuing fight over Afghan strategy
in the Obama administration” had one
positive outcome—that “the debate
and resulting presidential decisions led
to a steady narrowing of our objectives and our ambitions there.” As in
Iraq, the policy of the U.S. government
in Afghanistan shifted in response to
events. The process that led to the shift
in both cases was frustrating and exhausting, and the result in each case was
not what either president had wanted.
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According to Gates, each president
accepted his disappointment and tried
his best to find a realistic solution.
There is a lot more than Iraq and Afghanistan in Duty, but I have focused on
these two wars for two reasons. First, the
decision making in both cases illustrates the importance of our presidents
and their key advisers (such as Gates).
Second, a major decision made in the
first term of President George W. Bush
created the framework in which both
Bush and his successor had to work.
That decision was to engage in a “long
war” with Al Qaeda and any affiliated
group. That is, the threat of terrorist
attacks on the United States would be
dealt with by changing the character of
the Muslim Middle East and Afghanistan, initially through military or quasimilitary action, and then over time by
involving the United States deeply in the
affairs of both Iraq and Afghanistan.
When President George W. Bush authorized a preemptive attack on Saddam
Hussein’s regime in Iraq, he hoped, I
am sure, that the attack would achieve
multiple goals. One was to draw the
fangs of Hussein’s regime. Another
was to warn neighboring regimes that
the United States government would
and could take military action against
them if they pursued policies like those
of Hussein. Still another was to open
possibilities for responsible, accountable, and efficient governments in the
region. Yet another was to take away
the Arab focus on Israel and turn it
instead toward reform and modernization in the Arab states themselves.
These were very ambitious goals. The
administration of George W. Bush hoped
that these goals could be achieved within
a reasonable human and financial cost.
The Bush administration’s assumption
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in this regard was wrong. However, as
Gates understood, something had to
be done to salvage the situation, and
Gates worked hard with President
Bush and others to achieve that.
The Obama administration took office
with its own set of ambitious goals, including the aim of restoring stability and
productivity in the U.S. economy. Like
the administration before it, Obama’s
found that its goals in Afghanistan (to
defeat the Taliban and create a legitimate
regime in Afghanistan) were likely to be
far more expensive to achieve than Congress or the American people were willing to pay. What, then, to do? As Gates’s
memoir shows, the administration
stalled for time, in an attempt to keep
the military situation in Afghanistan
from growing worse while hashing out
an approach that would allow President
Obama to do two things that Secretary
Gates did not think he could accomplish:
salvage minimal but worthwhile U.S.
goals in Afghanistan and simultaneously
schedule the return of U.S. and NATO
forces as Afghan police and army forces
took up the fight against the Taliban.
Secretary Gates “bought time” for two
different administrations while he
dealt with serious budget issues, an
often recalcitrant Defense Department
bureaucracy (check out his account
of his efforts to get MRAPs built and
shipped to the theater), the issue of
homosexuals serving in the military,
the treatment of wounded military
personnel, and diplomacy, especially
relations with China and Russia. Is it
any wonder that he felt worn out after
four years and thousands of dead and
wounded American military personnel?
Duty is not an easy read. It explains a
lot about what a Secretary of Defense
can and cannot do and how national
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security decisions are made and then
undone. Gates puts it very well: “While
the national security apparatus to deal
with . . . problems is gigantic, ultimately
they all had to be addressed by just eight
people: the president, the vice president,
the secretary of state, the secretary of
defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the director of national intelligence, the director of the CIA, and the
national security advisor.” Duty is an
interesting window into the thoughts
and actions of one of those eight.
Thomas Hone

Formerly of the Naval War College, the Naval
Air Systems Command, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense

Porch, Douglas. Counterinsurgency: Exposing the
Myths of the New Way of War. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013. 434pp. $23.88

Douglas Porch, military historian and
academic, currently a distinguished
professor of national security affairs
at the Naval Postgraduate School, has
written a highly polemical and critical
intellectual history of counterinsurgency,
aka COIN. It has been selected by the
Army chief of staff for his professional
reading list, so it is a must-read, at least
for Army officers, and more generally
for those who follow a debate in which
sobriety and balance are rare virtues.
According to Porch, COIN’s intellectual
roots lie in nineteenth-century imperialism, which was often justified in
paternalistic ways. Even today, COIN’s
mission is to “civilize” indigenous societies by importing Western norms and
practices that are often severely at odds
with local custom or resented because
they are imported at the muzzle of an
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M16. Whether one considers the French
in Vietnam and Algeria or the British in
South Africa, Malaya, Palestine, Kenya,
Ireland, and Northern Ireland (and
elsewhere), the most common root of
insurgency, according to Porch, is that
other peoples do not wish to be ruled by
foreigners. Population-centric operations (Porch does not call them strategies) designed to win hearts and minds
have frequently failed, because insurgency is less about grievance resolution
for a “biddable population,” as COIN
proponents assume, than about ideology
or political goals. War among the people
thus often becomes war against the people, for a variety of reasons, beginning
with the fact that Western counterinsurgents often assume, with good reason,
that “the people” are in cahoots with the
insurgents, who otherwise would be unable to operate. Therefore, counterinsurgents seek to divide indigenous societies
in the colonial manner so as better to
control them, which only undermines
the modern state building that COIN
advocates seek to achieve. Furthermore,
a Western tradition that sees guerrillas
and insurgents as terrorists and criminal
assassins and not as lawful combatants has often led to illegal detention,
torture, denial of food, extrajudicial
execution, disappearances, concentration camps, and other counterproductive efforts to isolate the people from
insurgents, gain intelligence, and break
the will of the insurgents. In this way,
Porch argues that even in victory COIN
usually comes at a heavy moral price.
Porch also objects to COIN proponents’
seeing themselves as technicians, applying the “lessons” derived from historical
cases, especially Malaya. By focusing
on grievance alleviation as their central
concern, these military officers engage
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